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Sanctions are here to stay as an instrument of US foreign policy. But they remain faintly 
understood by most policy makers, a risk considering how frequently they are utilized. Worse, 
scant attention has been paid to one of the most important elements of sanctions use:  
ending them. 
As part of my research into sanctions more generally, I have sought to explore the unswept 
corners of sanctions policy, starting with the risk of sanctions overuse in May 2015 and 
continuing with consideration of how previously sanctioned jurisdictions can be reconnected 
to the global community. In this vein, the Center on Global Energy Policy has commissioned 
papers on Myanmar (by Peter Kucik) and Cuba (by Peter Harrell), in addition to my own paper 
on Iran. In August 2017, I examined the risk of the unintended consequences of sanctions from 
an unconventional perspective: the collateral damage done to other countries, in this case to 
Pakistan from Iran sanctions. 
This paper is intended to be another in this broad series returning to the process of 
terminating sanctions. By looking at Libya, a reasonably recent example, I hope to offer new 
answers to an old quandary: How do you stop imposing sanctions and make good on the 
implicit bargain in sanctions imposition as part of a diplomatic strategy? And what  
happens then?
Leaving consideration of the conclusion of this research to the paper itself, it is worth noting 
that it is these sorts of questions that this program—looking at economic statecraft, sanctions, 
and energy markets—will continue to address in the months and hopefully years to come.
PREFACE
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The diplomacy associated with Libya’s 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programs and support for terrorism has been rightly held up as a model. 
After years of isolation and international sanctions, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi decided 
to change course. He agreed to dismantle and repatriate most of his nuclear infrastructure, 
to eliminate his chemical weapon stocks and ballistic missiles, and to abandon the use of 
terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Libya wanted to be largely normalized and was 
prepared to pay a price to achieve this end but also wanted to receive the benefits of  
this normalization.
In this, Libya represents a useful test case for not only how sanctions can be imposed but 
also for how they can be relieved. Though often ignored as a component of the sanctions 
story, relief from sanctions once imposed is as important as the manner of their imposition. 
This is because sanctions are not just about denial of resources or access to an adversary; 
they are also intended to serve as an object lesson for other potential sanctions targets. For 
this reason, it is important that sanctions imposition is seen as aggressive and thorough but 
also that sanctions relief is seen as tangible and useful to those that may—one day—find 
themselves on the receiving end of a future sanctions effort. If sanctions are to serve their 
purpose for diplomatic leverage by inflicting consequences for misbehavior, then those who 
are made subject to them must also be able to articulate to audiences both at home and 
abroad that relief has its benefits. 
Based on a review of the data and anecdotal history, there appears to be sufficient grounds 
to support the contention that sanctions had an effect on Libya’s economy (and eventually 
on its decision-makers), as well as did their removal. There are inconsistencies in the data and 
historical record with respect to this conclusion. After all, though Libyan economic growth 
petered out, it did not bottom out as wide-ranging economic sanctions would normally 
intend. Likewise, though the Libyan economy did grow and investment increased after 2004, 
the fact that Libyan oil exports also increased at the same time dampens the enthusiastic case 
for the effects of sanctions relief. Moreover, considering the arc of time under consideration, 
it is possible that other issues—such as Gaddafi’s fear after 9/11 that Libya might be next 
after Afghanistan for harboring terrorists or that possession of a nascent WMD program 
would be similar cause for invasion after Iraq—weighed heavily in Libyan strategic thinking. 
But sanctions did play a role in constraining the decision-making of Libya and its ability to 
improve its economy. Moreover, in the end, a desire to rid Libya of sanctions—which Libyan 
officials have themselves affirmed was part of the Libyan strategic calculus at the time—led 
Libyan officials and Gaddafi personally to make changes to Libyan policy in a manner that was 
conducive to international interests with respect to WMD proliferation and terrorism.
For future relief scenarios, there are two recommendations for how best to evaluate sanctions 
relief performance. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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1. First, the United States should develop a framework for evaluating the performance of 
sanctions relief and publish information and data outlining the results of its evaluations. 
2. Second, the United States should facilitate clear conversations about the scope of 
potential sanctions relief and its limitations during negotiations of associated agreements. 
Both recommendations could complicate negotiations of agreements and selling them 
afterward, but they would also help to ground subsequent debates both at home and abroad.
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The diplomacy associated with Libya’s 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programs and support for terrorism has been rightly held up as a model. 
After years of isolation and international sanctions, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi decided 
to change course. He agreed to dismantle and repatriate most of his nuclear infrastructure, to 
eliminate his chemical weapon stocks and ballistic missiles, and to abandon the use of terrorism 
as a foreign policy instrument. Libya wanted to be largely normalized and was prepared to pay 
a price to achieve this end but also wanted to receive the benefits of this normalization.
In this, Libya represents a useful test case for not only how sanctions can be imposed but 
also for how they can be relieved. Though often ignored as a component of the sanctions 
story, relief from sanctions once imposed is as important as the manner of their imposition. 
This is because sanctions are not just about denial of resources or access to an adversary; 
they are also intended to serve as an object lesson for other potential sanctions targets. For 
this reason, it is important that sanctions imposition is seen as aggressive and thorough but 
also that sanctions relief is seen as tangible and useful to those that may—one day—find 
themselves on the receiving end of a future sanctions effort. If sanctions are to serve their 
purpose for diplomatic leverage by inflicting consequences for misbehavior, then those who 
are made subject to them must also be able to articulate to audiences both at home and 
abroad that relief has its benefits. 
This paper reviews first the history of sanctions imposition against Libya from 1980–2000 
and then sanctions relief from 2000–2011. In it, I offer an assessment first of the effects of 
sanctions and then the effects of sanctions relief, seeking to pin down the degree to which 
sanctions—rather than other economic factors or policy choices—were responsible for Libyan 
economic development. The paper then concludes with an analysis of the sanctions relief that 
Libya enjoyed and potential lessons for future sanctions imposition and relief projects.
One complication in performing this analysis is that, over the arc of the two decades of 
sanctions imposed against Libya, perspectives on WMD proliferation and terrorism support—
and what to do about them—changed. After 9/11 (and subsequent military operations in 
Afghanistan) and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it became plausible for Gaddafi to imagine that 
he and Libya might be next. Substantial scholarship has gone into this question,1 and those 
who had responsibility for overseeing the dismantlement of Libya’s WMD programs have 
laid out an impressive case arguing that the Bush administration’s hard power elsewhere 
was crucial to success.2 This paper does not argue against 9/11, Iraq, or the 2003 seizure of 
the BBC China (a ship bound for Libya with nuclear equipment) as vitally important parts of 
the story or even as tipping points. But as will be shown in the following pages, these events 
took place after Libya had already begun to seek a negotiated settlement to its isolation and 
after sanctions had begun to bite heavily. More than anything, these factors support my more 
general contention in every sanctions case: to be effective, sanctions must be embedded in 
a comprehensive, coherent, and integrated strategy in order to communicate demands and 
intentions clearly. If nothing else, the case of Libya from 1980–2006 is a further argument in 
favor of this perspective. 
INTRODUCTION
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1980–1992: US SANCTIONS ALONE
As for other oil-exporting states, much of the 1970s was to Libya’s benefit. The economy grew 
significantly during the decade (averaging 10 percent growth annually3), as did per capita 
incomes. Professor Ronald Bruce St. John—who has studied Libya for decades and is the 
author of numerous books on the subject—notes that “per capita incomes increased from $35 
in 1951 to a little more than $2,200 in 1969 to almost $10,000 a decade later.”4  The result was 
a new time of prosperity for the country and its population.
But with the beginning of the 1980s, Libya’s growth slowed considerably due to a combination 
of factors; in fact, Libya experienced a significant contraction for the first half of the decade 
(chart 1). Some of the decline is directly attributable to the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s. 
Whereas at the beginning of the decade oil cost over $30 per barrel, by 1985, prices were 
less than half that amount.5 St. John states that “in 1981–86, Libya’s annual oil revenues 
dropped from $21 billion to $5.4 billion.”6 For oil export–dependent countries like Libya, losing 
half of the national income was naturally damaging. However, Libya could have managed 
the situation better had its policy makers been diligent, careful, and thoughtful; in her 
comprehensive treatment of pre-2004 Libya sanctions, O’Sullivan has presented data that 
underscores the degree to which “Libya’s economic performance dragged behind other oil-
exporting countries subject to similar external shocks.”7 Instead, Libya’s decision-makers took 
a decidedly more radical approach. Gaddafi pursued austerity policies in order to compensate 
for lost oil income and simultaneously pursued a revolutionary approach to national 
jurisprudence and popular rights.8 Both were unpopular and, from an economic perspective, 
damaging in that they reduced the incentive and interest in investing in Libya from abroad
Chart 1: Libyan GDP, 1980–1992
Source: International Monetary Fund
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Simultaneously, Gaddafi was also seeking to demonstrate his revolutionary bona fides in a 
variety of Middle Eastern and African conflicts. Libya became a supporter of many different 
terrorist groups, permitting them to operate within Libyan territory. A 1986 State Department 
report offers a contemporary account of Libya’s various activities, the sum of which is the 
conclusion that “Qaddafi has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign 
policy and supports radical groups which use terrorist tactics.”9 
The United States responded to the Libyan government’s support of terrorism in the Middle 
East and beyond by naming it one of the first state sponsors of terrorism (SST) under the 
1979 Export Administration Act.10  Under the terms of the law then in place, Libya was 
prohibited from receiving US exports of military and dual use goods, US bilateral assistance, 
and US support in receiving loans from international financial institutions.11 In time, the scope 
of the prohibitions on SSTs grew as new laws were passed by Congress utilizing the same 
designation in order to deny such states access to the US economy more generally as well as 
goods that could support the development of WMDs.
However, Libya was singled out for additional pressure as a result of its foreign policy 
adventurism in Africa, an aggressive and expansionist interpretation of its territorial waters 
in the Gulf of Sidra, the murder of Gaddafi’s political opponents abroad (which even resulted 
in the shooting death of a British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, in London in 1984), and 
subversive activities worldwide. In 1982, President Reagan imposed a ban on imports of 
Libyan crude oil and exports to Libya of oil and gas equipment. In November 1985, Reagan 
banned the import of refined petroleum products from Libya, quickly followed by the 
imposition of a comprehensive embargo against Libya in January 1986 following terrorist 
attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports.12 Military pressure shortly joined sanctions after the 
April 5, 1986, bombing of the La Belle disco in Berlin, Germany, which killed 3 people and 
injured a further 230. The La Belle was frequented by US soldier, and in retaliation, President 
Reagan ordered Operation El Dorado Canyon, which included air strikes against a variety of 
Libyan targets. Though the embargo was later partially eased to avoid catastrophic economic 
losses for US oil and gas companies then operating in Libya, the effect was still significant: 
with the embargo, the United States essentially walled itself off from Libya (a condition that 
persisted for the next eighteen years).
The key question is the degree to which this sanctions pressure is responsible for the damage 
being done to Libya. O’Sullivan’s view is that, during the 1980–1992 period, most sanctions 
pressure was less damaging to Libya than the broader atmospheric factors affecting Libya 
(such as the aforementioned lost oil revenue) and overall government mismanagement. She 
notes that the direct impact of sanctions on financial flows, for example, was modest given 
the opportunities available to Libya to find other outlets for its now more limited capital. 
Likewise, though the United States banned oil imports from Libya, the nature of the global 
oil market was such that the United States merely shifted its purchases to North Sea oil, and 
other purchasers of oil shifted to pick up Libyan exports. O’Sullivan argues that there was 
an impact on Libya from US sanctions, but mainly in the area of Libyan oil production from 
previously US-managed oil fields due to lost access to spare parts and expertise when US 
companies shuttered their operations in the country. The US and European governments 
negotiated agreements that non-US companies would not step in to replace US companies at 
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those affected fields. Even then, though, Libya’s other oil fields—not covered by “no backfill” 
arrangements—were able to grow prodigiously , offsetting the production loss.
None of this is particularly surprising. It is a truism in sanctions policy for good reason that 
unilateral sanctions activities rarely work, given the diversity of other economies globally. With 
potentially very few exceptions (such as rare earths and other materials), no country holds an 
absolute monopoly on any one particular economic instrument or resource. For this reason, 
countries have often preferred to seek multinational support for their sanctions drives. The 
United States is no different, and from 1992–2004, it pushed for the aggressive expansion of 
sanctions against Libya—but this time of a multinational character. 
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As was the case with many other embargoes enacted by single states, the United States 
soon acknowledged that the diversity of alternative business partners for Libya—particularly 
in Europe—limited the damage imposed. Though the Reagan administration sought an 
agreement to impose reciprocal European measures against Libya, it achieved only “pledges 
of European governments to try to keep their companies from taking advantage of the 
departure of US firms from Libya.”13 
International disregard for Libya sanctions changed after the explosions of Pan Am 103 over 
Scotland in 1988 and French airliner UTA 722 over Niger in 1989. Subsequent investigations 
linked Libyan intelligence officers to both operations. Libya’s refusal to hand over the suspects 
implicated in the bombings resulted in consideration of UN Security Council sanctions in 1992. 
Resolution 748 took effect on April 15, 1992. It imposed a ban on air travel to and from Libya 
(with an exception for humanitarian travel), an embargo on arms and arms-related services to 
Libya, and a reduction of diplomatic personnel at Libyan embassies worldwide.14 Resolution 
883, adopted in November 1993, went farther: it prohibited the export to Libya of a wide 
range of oil and gas equipment, banned transactions involving Libyan airlines, and imposed 
an asset freeze on the Libyan government, with the significant loophole of permitting the 
repatriation of Libyan oil and agricultural revenues.15 
As described by Ethan Chorin, “Sanctions hit Libya like a bomb. Between 1992 and 1997 the 
consumer price index rose 200 percent, while salaries remained fixed…at between 150 and 
500 Libyan dinars (about $100 month). From 1992 to 1999, Libya’s economy grew, on average, 
at nugatory 0.8 percent.”16 Libya’s oil and gas production infrastructure suffered considerably, 
with downstream refineries forced to seek inferior and costly spare and replacement 
parts.17 From a systemic perspective, the uncertainties around Libya resulted in a number of 
deleterious knock-on effects. Inflation “soared” in response to the widening exchange rate 
between the Libyan dinar and US dollar (which was even worse in black market prices), and 
Libya was forced to respond defensively to the potential of additional sanctions by allocating 
greater amounts to national reserves.18  
On the other hand, oil production in Libya was steady throughout this period (chart 2). So 
were exports, particularly to Europe, where Libya “accounted for 21.6 percent of hydrocarbon 
exports to Italy; 10.8 percent to Germany; 7.6 percent to the UK; and, 5.5 percent to France.”19 
Sanctions stymied Libya’s ability to obtain new investment, particularly for projects that were 
ambitious or complex. But “unlike the situation in Iran, where the National Iranian Oil Company 
was opening its industry to foreign investment for the first time [since the revolution], 
outside involvement in Libya’s energy sector was long-standing”20 and not prohibited by the 
resolutions adopted by the UNSC.
1992–2003: MULTILATERAL PRESSURE
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Chart 2: Libyan oil production, exports, and domestic use, 1992–2004
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA)
The Libyan government utilized this continued access to international markets as well as its 
political connections in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to dampen enthusiasm for the 
US-led sanctions campaign. The Libyan government sought alternatives to compliance with 
the terms of resolutions 748 and 883, which permitted the suspension and termination of 
UNSC sanctions in the event that Libya handed over those suspected of being involved in the 
Lockerbie and Niger bombings for trial and renounced terrorism. 
The United States too recognized that the present level of pressure on Libya was likely 
insufficient to drive Libya into making concessions on such vital matters. In 1996, the US 
Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which threatened US market access to 
any foreign company that invested more than $40 million in Libya’s petroleum sector. The 
high monetary threshold of $40 million was such that few transactions would be implicated 
and others could be massaged because the provisions of ILSA specified “new” investments. 
Moreover, Professor Lisa Anderson (former dean of SIPA and a longtime scholar of North 
Africa) noted that “at the outset, the sanctions were probably a boon for the regime, serving 
to distract popular attention from the mismanagement that was responsible for many of the 
country’s economic and social woes.”21 
But, coming on the heels of the Helms-Burton Act (which threatened sanctions against those 
who did business with Cuba) and in tandem with frustrations over the “Iran” portion of ILSA, 
international reaction to these sanctions was hostile. The European Union passed legislation 
that prohibited compliance with extraterritorial sanctions requirements and threatened 
to file suit against the United States at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Clinton 
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administration responded to this pressure by exercising use of ILSA’s national security waiver 
provisions to avoid imposing sanctions against companies invested in Iran, which suggested a 
similar approach might be undertaken with respect to Libya.22 It also undertook to develop a 
proposal with the United Kingdom that would entail Libya surrendering the accused Lockerbie 
and Niger bombers for trial in the Netherlands and offered assurances that UNSC sanctions 
would be terminated if and when Libya satisfied the conditions of resolutions 748 and 883.
That said, real damage was being done to Libya through the opportunity cost of the 
sanctions. Libya was damaged directly through some of the measures adopted but more 
generally by the absence of any confidence in its future (necessary for investment across 
industries) and concerns about the capricious and reputation-damaging nature of its 
government. Libyan government officials later estimated that sanctions “cost Libya upwards 
of $30 billion.”23
Chart 3: GDP for Libya, 1992–2004 
Source: World Bank and IEA
Moreover, internally, the Libyan economy was being systemically undermined by the nature 
of the regime under sanctions, with “the inconvenience and scarcity sanctions produced 
soon [contributing] to growing corruption—both petty smuggling and more serious fraud, 
currency speculation and money laundering by senior officials—[that] in turn, fed domestic 
opposition.”24  It was in this context that Libyans—led by Sayf al-Islam Gaddafi, Muammar 
Gaddafi’s son—began to explore options for reform and international reengagement.
In April 1999, Libya surrendered the two Lockerbie suspects to the Netherlands. Consequently, 
the sanctions imposed in resolutions 748 and 883 were suspended via UNSC presidential 
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statement.25 However, the United States and the United Kingdom refused to permit a vote 
by the UNSC to terminate those sanctions until Libya fully accepted responsibility for the 
airliner bombings and renounced terrorism. The events of 9/11, perhaps ironically, were 
extremely helpful in prompting Libya to accept its responsibility, agree to pay an indemnity 
to the families of the victims of the two bombings, and to renounce terrorism. In part 
seeking to leverage the changing international perception of Libya and doubtless in part 
out of recognition that being seen as a sponsor of terrorism was a security risk, the Libyan 
government condemned the attacks and began to cooperate with the United States and its 
partners on counterterrorism. 
Libya had had a mixed history with Islamist groups, having fought against Libyan insurgent 
groups for over a decade. In February 1996, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
attempted to assassinate Gaddafi and “throughout the spring of 1996, armed battles raged 
throughout the mountains of eastern Libya between LIFG and Libyan security forces.”26  
Gaddafi may have intuited that the threat of groups like al Qaeda was as great to his 
own government as to those of the United States and Europe and that counterterrorism 
cooperation was a useful way to help preserve his own power.27 At a minimum, he was shrewd 
enough to recognize that there was an advantage internationally to consolidating his own 
struggle at home with the greater international problem of terrorism. Likewise, the United 
States—in the early stages of the War on Terror—also could utilize Libya’s conversion as a 
means of demonstrating the benefits of turning away from support for terrorism. 
On September 12, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1506, terminating the 
UNSC sanctions still then in place, if suspended.28 But the absence of US companies and US 
investment opportunities also proved distracting and damaging for Libya. As noted earlier, 
Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs and support for terrorism in general served to 
give the George W. Bush administration the support necessary to move forward with a more 
general loosening of sanctions starting in 2004.
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Though Libya had made sufficient progress to justify termination of UNSC sanctions, the 
United States had residual concerns with Libyan policy, particularly its potential for the 
development of WMD. Leveraging the negotiations and cooperation developed in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the United States and United Kingdom negotiated a separate 
arrangement with Libya for Libyan abandonment of its nascent WMD programs. In December 
2003, this agreement was announced by the Libyan government, starting a process for the 
removal of tons of nuclear equipment and materials as well as documents that established the 
process through which Libya had acquired uranium centrifuges and process equipment from 
the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. This network, named for the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
scientist who led its work, was responsible for the supply of nuclear equipment and expertise 
to a variety of potential nuclear weapons aspirants, including Iran and possibly Syria and 
North Korea. 
As US, UK, and international experts verified the absence of other undeclared nuclear 
activities in the country and began the process of eliminating Libya’s chemical and biological 
weapons programs, as well as its ballistic missiles, the United States also undertook efforts 
to provide Libya relief from sanctions. Throughout the spring of 2004, the United States 
reversed its sanctions on Libya, starting with the travel ban in February 2004 and ending with 
the termination of the US national emergency with respect to Libya in September 2004.29  
US sanctions imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 
require a declaration of a national emergency in order to permit the president to impose 
sanctions against a country; by terminating the national emergency, President Bush effectively 
terminated US sanctions. 
In November 2004, the White House asked Congress to remove a ban on export-import bank 
loans to Libya following the September decision to cancel the national emergency that had 
been declared with respect to Libya. In January 2005, Libya “awarded eleven of fifteen new 
exploration and production sharing agreements to American oil companies.”30 International 
energy companies that had never left Libya also continued their relationships, though with 
individual ones suffering or prospering depending on broader political issues (such as those 
associated with seaborne migration into Europe from Africa).
However, a new wrinkle emerged: reports that the Libyan government had sought to 
assassinate Saudi crown prince Abdullah over insults made against Muammar Gaddafi.31  
This delayed the ability of the United States to terminate Libya’s status as an SST until May 
15, 2006, by which time the Libyan government had taken a variety of steps to provide 
reassurance to the United States about its support for terrorism going forward. The US 
Department of State’s annual report on terrorism from 2005 provides a full accounting, but 
summarized, these included
1. conviction of Abulrahman Alamoudi for his dealings with Libya, including involvement in 
the Abdullah plot;
2004–2011: RELIEF ARRIVES
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2. negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which included the pardoning of five Libyans held in Saudi 
Arabia in connection with the plot;
3. cooperation with the United States and United Kingdom in curtailing the terrorism-related 
activities of the LIFG and negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom on the 
repatriation of Libyan nationals suspected of engaging in or facilitating terrorist activities;
4. extradition of terrorists located in Libya to Egypt;
5. cooperation with the international community to help ensure that its territory was not 
used as a safe haven for international terrorists; and
6. continued renunciation of terrorism by senior Libyan officials.32 
Consequently, by the time of the 2006 State Department report, the United States was 
prepared to announce as follows: “As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya’s 
leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United 
States rescinded Libya’s designation as a state sponsors of terrorism on June 30. Since 
pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States 
and the international community on counterterrorism efforts.”33 
With this, sanctions against Gaddafi’s Libya were terminated until the civil war that erupted in 
2011.
Some have argued that there was significant cynicism present in the approaches by Libyan 
and American policy makers, noting for example that Libya “had offered to open talks on the 
issues that provoked the US embargo—including the WMD programs” but had been rebuffed 
by the United States.34 Still, as noted, these events took place after Libya had already begun 
to seek a negotiated settlement to its isolation and after sanctions had begun to bite heavily. 
American reticence to engage with Libya aside, Libya’s own interest in pursuing talks and its 
satisfaction with the relief of sanctions are the larger questions here. 
One might suspect that if sanctions had played a substantial if not entirely determinative role 
in poor Libyan economic performance over the previous two decades, then their removal 
ought to have made a significant impact on Libyan economic performance from a positive 
perspective. In some respects, this may be the case. In contrast to the period of heaviest US 
and UNSC sanctions, Libyan economic growth improved steadily until 2007–2008 (chart 4). 
Certainly, for those measures most directly linked to external participation, Libya benefited 
greatly from sanctions’ removal. FDI levels may be the most straightforward proxy for 
international investment, and in this Libya did well after 2004 and until 2008–2009, when 
the onset of the Great Recession and drop in oil prices negatively affected investment 
opportunities and decisions around the world (chart 5).
LIBYA: SANCTIONS REMOVAL DONE RIGHT? A REVIEW OF THE LIBYAN SANCTIONS EXPERIENCE, 1980-2006
ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | MARCH 2018  | 18
Chart 4: Libyan GDP and oil exports, 2004–2015  
Source: IEA and World Bank
Chart 5: FDI in Libya, 2004–2016 (data from 2011 not available due to the civil war)  
Source: UNCTAD
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But the role played by oil prices in general complicates the nature of this story. In fact, 
increased oil prices during that period might account for some of the additional investment 
into Libya. Higher oil prices might have pushed international energy companies to find new 
sources of oil and gas, as well as given them the resources to do so. From 2004–2005, oil 
prices went up by 42 percent and again 19 percent from 2005–2006 (chart 6). Oil was and 
is Libya’s primary driver of economic activity and growth. In 2006, the World Bank outlined 
the nature of this dependency, noting that Libya’s “hydrocarbon sector [represents] about 
seventy-two percent of GDP, ninety-three percent of government revenues, and ninety-five 
percent of export earnings.”35 Simply by considering oil prices, one could argue that the 
generally stable situation in Libyan economic growth throughout the 1990s had more to do 
with the oil-dependent nature of the Libyan economy: stable prices with little investment in 
alternative economic means or expanded oil production would naturally lead to a stagnant 
level of economic growth.
Chart 6: Average monthly oil price, 1992–2015 (Brent, USD)
Source: EIA
However, Libyan FDI growth outpaced both, skyrocketing by 200 percent from 2004–2005 
and 100 percent from 2005–2006.36 Moreover, considering the fact that countries outside of 
the United States had been more or less free to invest in Libya during much of the previous 
two decades, it is unlikely to be entirely coincidental that the end of US sanctions in 2004 
paced a massive infusion of new investment into Libya. As Chorin noted, “When it went 
offline, Libya had been underexplored relative to other oil-producing countries…there was 
tremendous potential for bringing updated technology and methods to bear on existing 
production.”37 
LIBYA: SANCTIONS REMOVAL DONE RIGHT? A REVIEW OF THE LIBYAN SANCTIONS EXPERIENCE, 1980-2006
ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | MARCH 2018  | 20
The problem for Libya was that, instead of harvesting that increased investment and attention 
for new areas of economic growth, it continued to stagnate under the Gaddafi regime. As 
St. John notes throughout his description of the closing years of the Gaddafi government, 
though the regime sought to reform itself, there were significant difficulties in doing so both 
on conceptual grounds (as Gaddafi remained leader of the country) and practical grounds. 
Moreover, the investment and opening drive that began quickly in 2004–2006 also began to 
ebb, as problems with managing “frequent changes to tax and investment law as it applied 
to the oil industry activities” became more frequent and frustrating to those operating in 
Libya. A March 2010 report by the US Department of State on the investment climate in Libya 
describes some of the efforts undertaken by Libya to improve its attractiveness to outside 
investors. However, despite acknowledgments of billions earmarked for new infrastructure and 
new legislation that would improve opportunities for investors, the report also underscores 
the level of endemic corruption in the process, weak legal protection for foreign companies, 
prejudicial tax and ownership policies, and other hindrances to normal economic activity.38  
Not for nothing, in 2010, Libya ranked at 130 on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index and at 171 on the Economic Freedom Ranking of the Heritage Foundation.39 
Libya had gained concrete benefits from sanctions being lifted in the form of improved access 
to international markets and sources of capital, but it failed to adapt to the times and saw 
persistent diversion of state resources to Gaddafi projects with dubious prospects for success, 
contributing to broader economic issues (such as the Great Manmade River project or the 
idea of turning Sirte into the capital of the United States of Africa). In fact, Libya’s ability to 
improve growth and secure foreign investment could say more about the utility of sanctions 
relief if it were able to overcome broader, more systemic defects in its own economy.
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Based on a brief review of the data and anecdotal history, there are sufficient grounds to 
support the contention that sanctions had an effect on Libya’s economy (and eventually on 
its decision-makers), as did their removal. Libyan economic growth stalled out in comparison 
to other states in similar situations, as did foreign investment, when sanctions were imposed. 
When sanctions against Libya were eased starting in 2000 and especially after 2004, Libyan 
economic growth and foreign investment increased markedly. In other words, sanctions 
worked as intended.
But the data and anecdotal history do not entirely support this contention. After all, though 
Libyan economic growth petered out, it did not bottom out, as wide-ranging economic 
sanctions would normally intend. Likewise, though the Libyan economy did grow and 
investment increased after 2004, the fact that Libyan oil exports also increased at the same 
time dampens the enthusiastic case for the effects of sanctions relief. After all, the UN 
Security Council did not prohibit Libyan oil sales, and as detailed in the previous section, oil 
sales to Europe and elsewhere continued throughout the US embargo. Sanctions relief for 
Libya was primarily in the area of increased investment, for which the return on produced 
barrels of oil would be much slower than the increased exports would suggest. And if Libyan 
economic growth and oil exports were as tightly correlated, as seems likely, then this suggests 
that—regardless of sanctions relief—Libya was poised for an improvement economically. 
If we assume that the increased price in oil has more to do with Libyan economic growth, 
does that diminish the impact of sanctions relief on Libya and therefore the utility of sanctions 
in the first place? In my assessment, no. Sanctions did play a role in constraining the decision-
making of Libya and its ability to improve its economy. Moreover, in the end, a desire to rid 
Libya of sanctions—which Libyan officials have themselves affirmed was part of the Libyan 
strategic calculus at the time—led Libyan officials and Gaddafi personally to make changes 
to Libyan policy in a manner that was conducive to international interests with respect to 
WMD proliferation and terrorism.  There were material improvements in both areas, as Libya 
dismantled its nuclear weapons–related infrastructure and halted its support for terrorism.40 
Libya also eventually eliminated its stocks of chemical weapons and its long-range ballistic 
missile systems, though these were, as with Libya’s nuclear program, potentially less 
significant than originally feared. Even if the impact on Libya’s economy was more modest 
both in the imposition of sanctions and in their removal, in the end, they may have proved a 
useful catalyst.
Perhaps more interesting is the relationship between Libya’s sanctions relief and that enjoyed 
by other countries, such as Iran. Iran and Libya share some similarities. Both remain dependent 
on oil exports, though Iran’s less so in recent years than over the past decades. Both are also 
plagued by endemic corruption and uncertain regulatory and legal environments for foreign 
investors. And both were plagued by the same difficulty in sanctions relief: the unchanged 
nature of national leadership. Just as with Iran, there were many in the United States who had 
a less than enthusiastic reaction to the decision to relieve sanctions against Libya. Officials 
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
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in the US government as well as others outside of it expressed concern with the continued 
presence of Gaddafi as the unchallenged autocrat in charge of Libya, as well as its human 
rights record. For this reason (as well as the exposure of a plot to assassinate then Saudi 
crown prince Abdullah41), Libya remained under some residual sanctions as an SST despite 
relief from those that were most damaging to the Libyan economy.
But unlike with Iran, those doing business with Libya saw the situation differently after the 
nuclear agreement was reached in 2015. Even if it is too soon at the time of this writing to 
assess the ultimate economic benefits of the agreement fully implemented less than two years 
ago, there is sufficient dissimilarity in business attitudes toward the two countries to merit 
comment. In the case of Iran, there remains widespread trepidation, with minimal new oil and 
gas investment formalized; in the case of Libya, by just over a year into the agreement to 
terminate sanctions, 15 new oil and gas projects had been awarded. 
Some of this probably has to do with the economic conditions prevalent at the time. From 
2004–2005, a main topic of discussion was peak oil, the idea that worldwide crude oil 
production had reached its high water mark.42 Though some may have disagreed with the 
concept at the time, it was still a prevalent part of the international energy conversation. From 
this perspective, at the time, any potentially untapped production in Libya would have been 
seen as of central importance and value to international companies. Fast-forward to 2015, 
and the picture is considerably different: the discovery and tapping of new, unconventional 
sources of oil had changed the picture markedly, with oil prices both on the decline as 
well as expectations that oil fields would suddenly go dry. Iran and Libya faced different 
global economic conditions and expectations for their central product; consequently, their 
experiences of sanctions relief were different.
Yet another difference was the level of acrimony and disquiet over the Libyan and Iranian 
nuclear agreements, particularly within the United States. The agreements themselves were 
obviously different, with one involving removal of most of a country’s nuclear infrastructure 
and the other its management over a period of decades. And in part (though likely not in 
whole) this shaped the political forces arrayed in opposition to both agreements to relieve 
sanctions—but so too did the ongoing occupation and conflict in postinvasion Iraq as well as 
the nature of the political parties in control in Washington.
In considering sanctions relief for Libya, however, two potential lessons learned emerge that 
ought to be part of a future sanctions removal operation.
First, the United States should develop a framework for evaluating the performance 
of sanctions relief and should publish information and data outlining the results of its 
evaluations. Establishing a regular process for developing and issuing reports on the results 
of sanctions would be useful. First, it would create benchmarks and objective criteria 
through which relief can and should be evaluated. By outlining the topics to be examined 
and then creating a consistent data pool for the evaluation, the United States would be in 
a position to chart progress over time as well as to identify deficiencies. Bureaucratically, 
this function could land either at the State or Treasury Departments but perhaps would be 
best located within the intelligence community to provide a policy objective presentation. 
Second, the United States would be in a position to respond to criticism from the state 
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subject to sanctions relief as to the pace and progress of the relief, as well as to prioritize 
additional steps for improvement. Third, the United States would be able to identify areas 
for nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, and investors (US and third 
party) to consider how best to move forward with their respective activities. Fourth, even 
though this idea would be potentially politically sensitive in cases where there is debate over 
the agreements reached that permit sanctions relief to be granted, having a set of data that 
can be examined and debated—rather than confronting questions with separate pools of 
facts—would permit discussions to be more objective and sober.
Second, the United States should ensure clear conversations about the scope of potential 
sanctions relief and their limitations occur during negotiations of associated agreements. 
Clear discussions of this sort would ensure that there are no unfulfilled or inflated 
expectations of performance, which can be damaging to an agreement—particularly one in 
which sanctions relief is traded for something that is verifiable and traceable over time, such 
as WMD disarmament, support for terrorism, or improvement in human rights conditions. 
Inflation of expectations ought to be avoided by all parties, but the United States, in particular, 
should be in a position to outline after the fact the terms under which sanctions relief was 
given and potential limitations of those sanctions. The United States should consider outlining 
conditions in agreements that might preclude full implementation of sanctions relief in the 
targeted domestic economy. For example, if sanctions relief would permit investment in a 
country, then the United States ought to ensure that the country in question also commits to 
improvement of its own investment climate in clear, demonstrable ways. This would have the 
effect of making negotiations far more complicated and may be an objective pursued more 
than achieved, but it would also avoid confusion and misperceptions after the fact.
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